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Thomas L. Spray, MD
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSAnyone who is elected to this office, after the immediate ela-
tion, begins to recognize with increasing trepidation that he
has to come up with a presidential address. The difficulty of
thinking of something of any interest to say to several thou-
sand cardiothoracic surgeon colleagues is stressful to say the
least. Usually it seems the first step is to go back and read the
presidential addresses of the past presidents to try to get
some guidance. Unfortunately, in most cases, this process
simply leads to the recognition that someone much more er-
udite and eloquent has previously discussed most of the im-
portant topics. It is inevitable that the presidential addresses
tend to focus on the major issues in our field. These chal-
lenges include the necessity of change and the imperative
of innovation, the difficulty in residency training and attract-
ing qualified young surgeons into our area of specialty ex-
pertise, the challenges of the health care system in the
United States and its continual pressures on reimbursement
and yet increasing requirements for administrative activities,
and the responsibilities of our profession to underserved
populations around the world. Ultimately, all of these topics
share the common challenge of defining, attaining, and
maintaining quality in cardiothoracic surgery.
As medicine evolves in the United States, there is an
increasing quest for quality outcomes that provide value
for dollar spent. The mantra of quality has been taken up
by political leaders and major players in the entire health
care field.Quality is the new buzzword in health care policy.
A search of 3major journals in our field (Journal of Thoracic
and Cardiovascular Surgery, The Annals of Thoracic Sur-
gery, and European Journal of Cardio-Thoracic Surgery)
since 2000 reveals over 500 articles with quality as a key-
word. The difficulty in providing quality is perhaps not so
much the actual provision of quality care, which we in car-
diothoracic surgery have been doing for years, but the ability
to define quality care. In some respects, quality is a bit like
pornography. As Justice Potter Stewart1 said in a landmark
obscenity case: ‘‘I shall not today attempt to further define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within
that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligently doing so. But I know it when I
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To some extent, quality has the same difficulty of identity.
We may not be able to define it very well, but we know it
when we see it. However, complicating the discussion is
the fact that quality does not necessarily mean the same thing
to everyone. What we as cardiothoracic surgeons mean
when we discuss quality is usually quality outcomes,
whether in an elegant operation, innovative research, or ef-
fective teaching. To an insurer, quality may mean lower
cost and higher profit. To politicians, quality may mean
availability and affordability, and to the patient, quality
may mean accessibility, comfort, and efficiency. Thus, we
have a ‘‘quality conundrum.’’ The Oxford English Dictio-
nary defines quality as ‘‘the degree of excellence of some-
thing as measured against other similar things; or general
excellence.’’ A conundrum is defined as ‘‘a confusing and
difficult problem or question; or a riddle.’’ We are increas-
ingly challenged to improve the quality of our care, but no
one can agree on an accurate definition of quality to provide
a framework. Our surgical results are reported publically, yet
the data are statistically inadequate to allow valid compari-
son of outcomes among centers and surgeons. Our reputa-
tions and reimbursements may be held hostage to invalid
and inaccurate measures of quality. We are expected to inno-
vate, yet chastised for ‘‘failures.’’ We are asked to train our
successors as quality surgeons, yet are increasingly sub-
jected to work-hour restrictions that limit total operative ex-
perience and continuity of patient care. We are expected to
do all of these things in an environment of constant pressure
to decrease costs.Quality is now the political catchphrase for
health care policy, just like ‘‘managed care’’ and ‘‘relative
value reimbursement’’ were politically motivated buzz-
words in the past. How we solve the riddle of quality is
also likely to affect us all.
As the quest for quality continues, there have been in-
creasing numbers of government requirements for public re-
porting of mortality outcomes, particularly in cardiovascular
surgery. The public reporting of mortality outcomes in med-
icine has a long history.2 Dr Ernest Codman,3 who was at an
institution in Boston, proposed reporting a hospital’s mortal-
ity results, believing that this would inform consumers and
that other institutions would rapidly adopt the practice. Un-
fortunately for Dr Codman, his own hospital went out of
business shortly after his suggestion and there was little en-
thusiasm for following his example. The rapid advancement,
however, of institutional and statewide databases to collect
mortality outcome data has resulted in these data being
widely available. There is the temptation, therefore, to use
these data as a measure of quality and to compare the qualityrdiovascular Surgery c Volume 138, Number 5 1053
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fact achievable is, I think, highly questionable. Needless to
say, public reporting of hospital mortality data is a reality
now for all cardiac surgeons not just in terms of their own
unit’s mortality, but also individual surgeon’s outcome mor-
tality. In the zeal to provide public reporting and transpar-
ency to permit patients better access to quality data, which
may impact their choice of providers for care, it is important
to not create too many unintended negative consequences.
For example, to improve reported outcome, centers could
deny care to high-risk patients. The advent of the Internet
has made the patient an active participant in the selection
of alternatives of care based upon often inadequate data. It
could be argued that the patients have not gained signifi-
cantly from the public reporting requirements that are now
increasingly being applied.
One of the consequences of the emphasis on quality is an
almost insatiable demand for ‘‘data’’ that can be used to dis-
criminate between surgeons and institutions, thus ranking
them from best to worst. These data are avidly sought by pa-
tients, referring physicians, the press, third-party payers, and
governments. However, the data that exist are flawed and of-
ten misinterpreted. The ability of the patient, reporters, and
politicians to understand the complexity of the other associ-
ated variables is quite limited. I am always amused by the
comments of a British legislator who, in response to a study
of perceived poor surgical outcomes for congenital heart dis-
ease in some centers in England (The Bristol Inquiry), stated:
‘‘I have just heard that 50% of UK surgeons are below
average [emphasis added]. . . . This has got to stop!’’4
Clearly many interested parties, including surgeons, politi-
cians, journalists, and consumers, do not understand the lim-
itations of risk models.5 As Dr Bruce Lytle6 remarked in his
presidential address to this Association a few years ago:
‘‘Sometimes there is an overwhelming demand for informa-
tion and a whole lot less appreciation for the truth.’’6
The field of cardiothoracic surgery has had a long-stand-
ing commitment to the careful study of patient outcomes and
the factors affecting those outcomes. In the early years of our
specialty, we had the advantage of having a frequent out-
come that was measureable and specific, that is, death. For-
tunately for our patients, this outcome, although of utmost
importance, has become less useful as a marker of quality
as the results improve and mortality continues to decrease
for most cardiothoracic surgical procedures. Mortality is
now infrequent enough in most institutions so that the
95% confidence limits for mortality rates overlap, making
statistically valid differences extremely rare between institu-
tions. Despite these statistical limitations, many have tried to
‘‘rank’’ institutions and surgeons based on mortality. Simi-
larly, congenital heart surgery outcomes data in The Society
of Thoracic Surgeons (STS) database might be used to com-
pare one institution over another.7 Mortality for congenital
cardiac procedures, although higher than for most adult1054 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Suprocedures, is low and continues to decrease. In a study of
risk-adjusted mortality rates for congenital heart procedures
comparing institutions, the hospitals are ranked by outcomes
(Figure 1).8 Yet the overlap of confidence intervals makes
any such ranking highly dubious. Only 2 of the 22 institu-
tions had statistically different outcomes, despite the ranking
of all 22 (Figure 2).9 Thus the utility of comparisons based
on mortality to discriminate institutional or surgeon quality
based on volume or mortality as an outcome is virtually im-
possible over a reasonable time frame, no matter how many
overall cases are collected. Thus, there is increasing recogni-
tion that outcomes and quality must be evaluated by some
measure other than simple mortality. Other outcomes such
as complications, care process, and appropriateness or
some type of composite score may be better measures of
quality.
We also must acknowledge that a unique aspect of medi-
cal practice, and especially cardiothoracic surgery, is the
need to take risk and responsibility to effect a change in out-
come. If we as surgeons are to be evaluated solely on mor-
tality outcomes, progress may be stifled as we run the risk
of being too conservative. An example of this problem is
the development of the Norwood operation for hypoplastic
left heart syndrome (HLHS), a congenital heart defect that
is associated with almost certain death in the first few days
or weeks of life. Early in the application of the Norwood pro-
cedure for palliation of HLHS, the mortality was almost the
same as the natural history. Many centers and many sur-
geons tried the operation with minimal successes. Had insti-
tutional outcomes been published in those early days, the
overall programmatic survival rates would have been seri-
ously affected and would have led to criticism of surgical
quality in the programs that took on this challenging new
therapy. Yet without perseverance, and the acceptance of
the risk, the advances that have made the mortality 5% or
less for good candidates for the Norwood operation would
never have been achieved, not to mention the collateral ben-
efits of the development of infant cardiac transplantation,
perioperative treatment and monitoring strategies, and
many more areas that have benefited all patients with con-
genital heart disease.
An additional difficulty in evaluating quality is that
comorbidities and other patient factors may have more to
do with the surgical outcome in many cases than the actual
technical procedure itself. In addition, there is widespread
recognition in the field of cardiothoracic surgery that out-
comes more commonly reflect team performance rather
than individual surgeon performance and the technical pro-
cedure. Cardiothoracic surgeons have initiated and led
significant efforts to identify patient, institutional, and man-
agement factors that may modify outcomes. Current risk
adjustment models fail to capture the entire complexity of
patient comorbidity needed to enable accurate comparisons
of outcomes between institutions or between surgeons in thergery c November 2009
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CI, confidence interval.same institution. As an example, extensive efforts have been
focused on developing risk stratification methodology for
congenital cardiac procedures. These efforts have identified
important factors such as age, weight, and associated genetic
or noncardiac abnormalities. However, with increasing rec-
ognition of risk factors, the number of patients in each risk
category becomes increasingly small even for very high-
volume programs, further compounding the problems in
comparing surgeons and institutions.
Lack of accurate data is also a major issue. Many govern-
ment agencies and third-party payers utilize administrative
data sets to assess outcomes and quality. The difficultyThe Journal of Thoracic and Cawith all administrative databases is the fact that the data
are only valid to the extent that they are accurately and com-
pletely acquired and there is independent verification. Such
processes require large amounts of infrastructure and are ex-
pensive to perform. Although there has been increasing call
for application of the electronic medical record, which may
have the ability to capture some of these data, there has been
virtually no support either from public or private sources for
the systems and especially the manpower necessary to col-
lect and validate these large amounts of clinical data, not
to mention the restrictions placed on institutions by the
HIPPA requirements for patient confidentiality, whichFIGURE 2. Standardized mortality ratio.rdiovascular Surgery c Volume 138, Number 5 1055
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research.
Despite all of the restrictions and inaccuracies, we as car-
diothoracic surgeons, more than perhaps any other specialty,
have been leaders in embracing the collection and reporting
of our outcomes to improve the counseling of our patients.
The STS database now contains the results of many thou-
sands of operations performed over the last 10 to 15 years
at a large representation of the units practicing cardiotho-
racic surgery in the United States. Despite this huge data col-
lection, it is extremely difficult to discriminate quality
among the outcomes of different institutions. This is true
even when volumes of procedures are quite high, which
can provide adequate numbers for most comparisons. Hav-
ing stated this fact, however, the value of these large
multi-institutional databases, like the STS database, is very
significant. They enable us to see what the overall success
rates are for various surgical procedures and give a perspec-
tive we can share with our patients.
As cardiothoracic surgeons, we must be honest about the
implications of the data that we are collecting. We as sur-
geons must be able to discuss with our patients the expected
outcomes and put the variability in perspective. We have to
take the responsibility for educating the patients as to the
value and comparative effectiveness of our procedures;
only by continually collecting and examining data can we
achieve this.
So how then can we evaluate quality and improve it over
time for a population of patients? One suggestion that has
been proposed is rather than focus on mortality as an
outcome, we need to focus more on care process and appro-
priateness. Increasing numbers of guidelines are being de-
veloped for the care of various cardiac conditions by
major associations such as the American Association for
Thoracic Surgeons (AATS), STS, American College of Car-
diology (ACC), and American Heart Association (AHA).
Rather than focusing on purported ‘‘quality measures’’
such as the timing of antibiotic administration in the operat-
ing room or the duration of ventilatory support or hospital
stay, which can be influenced greatly by the nature of the
procedure, whether emergency or elective, or the other co-
morbidities of the patient that may be difficult to collate,
the application of the appropriate treatment for the appropri-
ate patient at the appropriate time could possibly be tracked.
A risk, however, in this approach is the fact that guidelines
are just that and there will always be exceptions. Group
mean data doesn’t necessarily tell you much about an indi-
vidual patient or how he or she will respond to treatment un-
der the guidelines. There is always significant interpatient
variability, the reasons for which we rarely understand.
Identical treatment is not always equally effective treatment.
Perhaps, exceptions to guidelines should be individually
analyzed and not placed in the database with other patients,
but each case separately analyzed for outcome, such as how1056 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Suwe use morbidity and mortality conferences in all of our
surgical specialties. We cannot ignore the fact that clinical
decision making remains as much an art as a science. Rou-
tinely reporting the use of ‘‘appropriate’’ medical manage-
ment, discharge planning, and rehabilitation may be just as
important in determining quality outcome as simply publish-
ing differences in mortality rates.
One risk, of course, with use of guidelines is the fact that
‘‘best practice’’ guidelines may stifle innovation if new
approaches to medical conditions are not permitted. A
good example in the field of pediatric cardiac surgery is
the application of the arterial switch procedure for transposi-
tion of the great arteries. At the time of the introduction of
the arterial switch operation in the newborn period, the
mortality rate for a standard atrial switch operation had de-
creased to around 3% in many centers. Even the most expe-
rienced centers beginning the arterial switch operation had
mortality rates of 10% or higher. It is hard to believe that
such a procedure could be applied in the current environ-
ment where acceptance of a higher mortality rate for the pos-
sibility of long-term benefit in quality of life would be
difficult to get past an Institutional Review Board or gain
the approbation of our referring cardiologists!
Monitoring and even mandating care based on application
of ‘‘best practice’’ consensus guidelines and ‘‘quality met-
rics’’ can sometimes result in wrong and even dangerous
consequences for our patients. In an excellent editorial by
Jerome Groopman and Pamela Hartzband10 published in
The Wall Street Journal entitled ‘‘Why ‘Quality’ Care Is
Dangerous,’’ the authors discuss the limitations of pay-
for-performance schemes that are becoming increasingly
popular in Medicare as well as private insurance programs.
Physicians who do not conform to defined quality guidelines
may be penalized both in public stature and in payment, and
patients are financially discouraged from receiving care from
them. Yet the level of evidence for most clinical guidelines is
remarkably flimsy. In a study of 16 ACC/AHA clinical prac-
tice guidelines by Tricoci and coauthors,11 only 314 of 2711
(11%) recommendations were classified as level of evidence
A (evidence based on multiple randomized trials or meta-
analyses), whereas almost half were level of evidence C
(based on expert opinion, case studies, or standard of
care). Much of what we think we know will eventually be
proven inaccurate, or simply wrong, as information evolves.
Rigid application of guidelines may actually be harmful, as
noted by a recent study of the effect of tight glucose control
in diabetics. Rigid control of blood sugar is a guideline cur-
rently recommended by the American Diabetes Association
and The Joint Commission has adopted it as a quality metric.
But a recent study has shown that, in fact, mortality was in-
creased in a population of patients where rigid glucose con-
trol was applied.10,12 Similarly, studies of the outcomes of
hip and knee replacement showed that the application of
Medicare pay-for-performance quality metrics had no effectrgery c November 2009
Spray Presidential Addresson the complications or clinical results of surgery. The ad-
vance of our field requires that we be surgeon-scientists,
that we remain skeptical about ‘‘proven’’ therapies until
there is a preponderance of evidence, and that doubt is our
constant companion.
Quality care in cardiothoracic surgery requires attracting
and maintaining quality providers. Residency training in
cardiothoracic surgery remains problematic. Every year,
the number of qualified applicants for residency positions
appears to be dropping and more and more residency train-
ing programs are closing. The work rules that were created in
response to a case in New York, now over 10 years old, have
resulted in increasing restrictions on the ability of surgical
residents to participate in the operating room consistently
and on their ability to provide comprehensive patient care
over the time course of a patient’s hospitalization.13 Good
clinical judgment comes from experience, and experience
is the opportunity to learn from bad judgment, and also to
learn to live with the result. Despite all of the emphasis on
limiting the workweek for residency training, there have
not been any consistently validated studies that have shown
an improvement in overall clinical outcomes or for that mat-
ter in residency competency and training. If anything, the
pass rates on the board examinations in cardiothoracic sur-
gery, both the written and oral, seem to be lower than they
were a mere decade ago. Our current residents like the less
onerous work hours, but it will be incumbent upon us in ac-
ademic medicine to craft education programs that give train-
ing opportunities that result in a cardiothoracic surgeon
coming out of training with the skill set necessary to suc-
ceed, despite very limited hours in which to achieve such
training and experience. The joint effort by the AATS,
STS, The American Board of Thoracic Surgery, the Tho-
racic Surgery Resident Directors Association, and Thoracic
Surgery Foundation for Research and Education have sup-
ported the recruitment of a Director of Surgical Education,
Dr Ed Verrier, to coordinate educational activities in cardio-
thoracic surgery, which may be a major step in this process;
however, ultimately it will only succeed if the individual in-
stitutions providing residency training provide the mentor-
ship, financial and administrative support, and educational
curriculum necessary to develop the leaders of the future.
In this regard, it may well be that the number of residency
positions should decrease and be concentrated only in
centers that have the breadth of clinical activity, dedication,
enthusiasm, and perhaps most importantly, the human and
financial resources required for residency training.
It is extraordinarily gratifying to see the number and qual-
ity of women who are entering our field despite the difficulty
of balancing lifestyle and family life with the demands of the
high-pressure specialty of cardiothoracic surgery. Despite
our lamentations that the number of applicants has decreased
every year, I still believe that the quality of product at the end
of our training in most cases is just as good today as it was 15The Journal of Thoracic and Cyears ago. Why is it then that there is not a larger body of
residents who wish to enter cardiothoracic training? The an-
swer is obviously multifactorial, but clearly the core values
of our specialty as beautifully described by Bruce Lytle6 in
his presidential address ‘‘include assumption of personal re-
sponsibility, demand for technical excellence, leadership, in-
tellectual credibility, and mentoring.’’ To that list I would
add courage and sacrifice. What we do is hard. We cannot
lower our standards, nor should we for our patients’ sake.
Young surgeons who share these values will still enter our
profession provided that at the end of their training they
can get a satisfactory employment opportunity that will be
rewarding to them and provide both virtue and respect.
Another fundamental area necessary in any discussion of
quality is that of change and innovation in our specialty.
There is no question that innovation is imperative for all
areas of investigation and our field has changed dramati-
cally; however, we have always been able to adapt to
change, and our specialty has thrived based on its ability
to analyze itself to constantly try to improve the technology
to benefit our patients and to make modifications that will ul-
timately be to their advantage. Some innovation is not prog-
ress, and there will be, as in the past, many procedures that
will go by the wayside as newer, more innovative, and better
approaches are introduced. The advent of the Internet has
made the patient an active participant in the selection of al-
ternatives of care based upon often inadequate data. Because
some newer procedures can be done in a less invasive way
that minimizes discomfort and immobility and maximizes
early return to work and family responsibilities, the public
today is actively seeking these new procedures that are
less effective and possibly less durable than our older proce-
dures. As these technologies continue to flourish, it will be
our greatest responsibility to analyze the outcomes and to
be sure that the compromises we make for less morbid
approaches to intervention do not ultimately compromise
our patients’ long-term outcomes for the sake of cosmetic
benefit or short-term gains.
In many ways, we in the field of medicine should con-
stantly strive for our own obsolescence. As we develop
more innovative techniques and medical treatments, what
we think of as surgery today will be considered archaic in
only a fairly short time. The topics discussed at the first
meeting of this Association would be barely recognizable to-
day, and the topics of this meeting I am sure will be similarly
obscure 20 years from now. We are ever changing, reinvent-
ing ourselves, and evolving as a specialty. Even the technol-
ogies that have replaced ours, such as percutaneous stenting
of coronary arteries, are now coming under increasing pres-
sure, and the volume of these procedures is dropping as bet-
ter recognition of the genetics and pathobiology of coronary
disease and medical treatments and lifestyle changes de-
crease the incidence and severity of coronary vascular
disease.ardiovascular Surgery c Volume 138, Number 5 1057
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change in America. The system of multiple private health
insurers with different claims forms and different payment
schedules, the increasing number of citizens without any ad-
equate health care coverage, and the pressures on health sys-
tems from burdens of paperwork and regulations continue to
make the US health system the most expensive in the world
and arguably the system with the least value per dollar spent.
Recent well-publicized studies suggest that we are spending
more than any other country on our health care and receiving
the least ‘‘amount’’ of health. Most major indicators, such as
infant mortality and incidence of obesity and many others,
suggest that the United States falls well behind other devel-
oped countries in the overall health of its population. Al-
though many of these changes could be ascribed to the
unique character of our nation, with a large and constantly
changing immigrant population and a wide disparity in
wealth limiting the access to care, I think also some blame
has to be apportioned to the concept that health care is a priv-
ilege, not a right in our country. The private insurance indus-
try has been effective in managing care, but at the price of
administrative costs and return on shareholder investment,
which actually take dollars out of the health care system
and away from actual provision of patient care. No other in-
dustrialized country has a health system that works in such
a fashion. It seems well past time for there to be a general
level of medical care for all citizens regardless of age, or eth-
nic background, or level of income. Such a level of a care
must be provided by a government- authorized, if not neces-
sarily government-run, system that can be distributed
equally across all state lines, resulting in administrative sav-
ings that can be placed back into the system to provide more
care for our population. It is important to note that health
care will still be expensive. Despite the calls to increase pre-
ventative health care, there is little evidence that such an ap-
proach will decrease cost. Cancer therapies will likely
become more expensive, as cancer treatment, like the treat-
ment of AIDS, becomes treatment of a chronic disease rather
than a short-term ‘‘cure.’’ Private insurance may well then,
as in many other countries, become a supplemental insur-
ance that can provide higher levels of technology and care
to those that are willing to pay the cost. Such systems are
never perfect, and inevitably in some way must ration
care, as the ability to have unlimited care at restricted cost
is a fallacy that I don’t believe can ever be reconciled. The
fundamental problem is that people want state-of-the-art
care, on demand, at low cost. As the population ages and
technology evolves, you may be able to have 1 or 2 of these
needs met, but not all 3. Complicating the issue is the need
for patients to take responsibility for their own health. Soci-
ety has a moral obligation and responsibility to provide
health care as a ‘‘safety net,’’ but in a free society, adults
must accept some personal responsibility. What do we do
with the smoker who cannot or will not quit, or those who1058 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Suwill not lose weight or take the medications necessary to
control their blood pressure? Provision of health care is
a 2-way street, and the physicians must not be held solely
responsible for health outcomes that are also the patient’s
responsibility.
How, then, do we maintain and promote excellence in an
environment of increasing oversight, regulation, and litiga-
tion? If we are going to increasingly be subject to reporting
of outcome measures, then it is incumbent upon us to pro-
vide better education of the public and providers on how
to interpret and use this information. We have to find better
methods for summarizing complex patient characteristics
and find care processes and composite outcome measures
that are meaningful and reflect the goal of optimal patient
outcomes. In all of these approaches, the goal should be to
promote quality improvement, not to increase our individual
market share.
How can we solve the ‘‘quality conundrum’’? First, I be-
lieve we as a specialty have always provided high-quality
care and value for our patients and we will continue to do
so. The AATS has developed its mission to model quality
and excellence in the areas of clinical care, teaching, and re-
search through its support of research programs and grants,
its leadership development courses and educational scholar-
ships, and its annual meeting. If we are to solve the quality
riddle, we must continue to collect clinical outcome data,
critically evaluate the data we collect, and appropriately rec-
ognize the patterns that produce improvements in overall
results. We must share with each other processes that are
successful rather than attempt to rate or rank institutions
and individual surgeons. We must train the next generation
of surgeon-scientists not just in basic science but in clinical
outcomes analysis to give them the tools to succeed in this
changing health care environment. Surgeon-led research in
areas pertinent to our specialty has never been more impor-
tant than it is today, and must be supported at every level.
I believe that the field of cardiothoracic surgery offers the
greatest opportunity in medicine for personal responsibility.
When we enter the operating room, the patient’s life is liter-
ally in our hands. In my specialty area of congenital heart
surgery, there is nothing more gratifying than to perform
a procedure that may provide a child a chance at a long
and productive life. There is little that is better than that! If
we value the virtues of risk and responsibility, then respect
will surely come and compensation will surely be adequate,
if not lavish. We still are a profession that is well respected
even among people who know very little about what we ac-
tually do in the operating room. I was on an airplane re-
cently, sitting next to a businessman who in the course of
conversation asked me what I did for a living. I said, ‘‘I am
a pediatric cardiac surgeon.’’ His answer was ‘‘Thank you,’’
and yet I have little doubt that he knew virtually nothing about
what actually takes place in the operating room in pediatric
cardiac surgery or had any personal experience with it.rgery c November 2009
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cause we always do it that way.’’ True excellence comes not
just from good clinical outcomes, but from the constant dis-
satisfaction with the status quo. Changing our procedures
and systems takes calculated risk, often a leap of faith, and
sometimes the new approach will fail. But we must have
the courage to realize that the easy way is not always the
best way. We must constantly examine and modify our prac-
tices despite the risks to improve patient care.
Health care policies are often instituted based on political
whim or the current fashion. We must continue to educate
politicians, the press, and the public about the limitations
and unintended consequences of these often well-meaning,
but poorly designed, initiatives. It is critical that we remain
leaders in the collection and analysis of outcome data and
the development of new health care policy.
Finally, I believe that quality (excellence) may best be
defined by willingness to take risk to benefit our patients,
and to assume responsibility for the results of that risk . . .
characteristics that practitioners of our specialty of cardio-
thoracic surgery have like no others. As Teddy Roosevelt14
once said:
It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points
out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of
deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs
to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is
marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives val-
iantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, be-
cause there is no effort without error and shortcoming;
but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who
knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; whoThe Journal of Thoracic and Caspends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best
knows in the end the triumph of high achievement,
and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while dar-
ing greatly, so that his place shall never be with those
cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor
defeat.
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